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I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly a century, the United States has seen the continuing development
and refinement of judicial conduct regulation,' but it was only around the turn of
the twenty-first century that several other common law countries turned in
earnest either to the initial formalization or the reform of such regulation.2 The
fact that none of this movement on judicial conduct regulation outside of the
United States has precisely imitated any of the systems in place in the United
States suggests that a look at these various efforts abroad, both their purposes and
the mechanisms being put in place to achieve those purposes, may be of interest.'
This Article therefore provides an overview or survey of recent developments
and practices in four national common law systems-those of Australia, Canada,
England & Wales, and New Zealand-in which recent efforts have been made to
address matters of judicial conduct regulation relating in particular to the
promotion of public confidence in the judiciary. It seeks, further, to determine
what may be learned from these efforts.
Meaningful regulation of judicial conduct must flow from a clear idea of the
ends for which the judiciary is constituted and the values or virtues central to the
accomplishment of those ends. It must then connect the regulation of judicial
conduct (as opposed to actual judicial decisionmaking) with those ends and
values. In order to judge what judges do or how they behave, apart from the
actual decisions they make, one must tailor that judgment to what matters to the
role they play. Thus, in order to realize the benefit of efforts at reform, objectives
need to be clearly articulated and embedded in the design of that reform. Some
common themes immediately emerge when looking at the objectives of conduct
regulation stated in the sources from each of the systems discussed here.
Foremost among these are the themes of independence, impartiality, integrity,
and public confidence. This Article focuses on the last of these, which is often
given pride of place as a primary driving force behind the others: promotion and
1. See, e.g., CANONS OF JuDICIAL ETHICS (1924); CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1972); MODEL CODE OF
JUD. CONDUCT (1990); MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2007).
2. For example, the Parliament of New Zealand passed the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial
Conduct Panel Act in 2004 (amended in 2010). The Council of Chief Justices of Australia produced its Guide to
Judicial Conduct (Second Edition) in March 2007. The Judges' Council of England & Wales published its
Guide to Judicial Conduct in October 2004 and the Act of Parliament establishing the prescribed procedures for
judicial discipline and the Office of Judicial Complaints dates from 2006. Of course it is not the case that there
was no regulation of judicial conduct prior to these dates, but certainly these are the most significant and
programmatic efforts at formal and standardized regulation in these other common law countries. On earlier
efforts at regulation of judicial misconduct, see, e.g., M.H. Hoeflich, Regulation of Judicial Misconduct from
Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 LAW & HIST. REv. 79 (1984); Edward J. Schoenbaum, A Historical
Look at Judicial Discipline, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1977).
3. To the extent that some of the state systems of judicial conduct regulation in the United States govern
conduct in regimes that incorporate popular election of judges, it is unsurprising that other common law
countries (where the idea of election of judges is considered bizarre if not outright dangerous!) would not have
imitated these systems. However, to the extent that other state systems and the federal system operate in
contexts with exclusively appointed judges, it is interesting that there has not been more direct influence.
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maintenance of public confidence in the judiciary. Public confidence is indeed
desirable for the legitimacy of the institution, but what do we mean by public
confidence in the judiciary? And what concerns attend the use of public
confidence as a goal or as a measure of performance? How do various countries
aim at public confidence and what mechanisms do they use in their systems of
judicial conduct regulation that can be meaningfully connected to the
achievement of public confidence? Do they work? This Article examines those
questions.
Judges in common law countries share, more or less, the same practical basic
job description. They are charged with deciding, according to the law, the cases
properly before them. Further, judges are expected to exercise judgment where
the law may be underdetermined in prior interpretations of the law, reasoning by
analogy, looking for fit with other aspects of determined law, and so on. The
trick is in moving from that generally agreeable statement to the workable and
meaningful regulation of judicial conduct, particularly where the stated goal of a
regulatory regime is public confidence. The focus, in these common law
countries coming more recently to the task of establishing formal mechanisms for
regulation of judicial conduct, is clearly on public confidence.6 Some have argued
that the best way for judges to gain public confidence is simply to do a good job.
That, of course, may be true, but it demands answers to complicated questions
about what public confidence is, why it is important, and what it means for a
judge to do a good job. Furthermore, there turns out to be some conceptual and
4. See, e.g., CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR JUDGES 14, available at
http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news-pub-judicialconductPrinciples_1998_en.pdf (last visited Aug.
2, 2010) [hereinafter ETHICAL PRINCIPLES] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("Public confidence in and
respect for the judiciary are essential to an effective judicial system and, ultimately, to democracy founded on
the rule of law.").
5. While there may be a basic agreement at a conceptual level about the job of a common law judge,
there are of course differences as well, so it will be useful to take certain issues off the table for the discussion
that follows. For example, let us assume that we are dealing only with the regulation of appointed judges, rather
than elected judges. (The regulation of elected judges, particularly in the state courts of the United States, raises
issues that demonstrate the very reasons why judges ought not be elected in the first place.) Let us further
assume that we are dealing with judges who are given either life or fairly long term tenure. With these as
common terms, we may somewhat more easily build up an idea of shared goals and values for the judiciary and
imagine, with those goals in mind, what judicial regulation actually consistent with those goals would look like,
and how it would succeed or fail in accomplishing those goals, either practically or theoretically.
6. Concerns about public confidence in regulation of judicial conduct are mirrored in the judicial
appointments process. With regard to the judiciary of England & Wales, Baroness Prashar stated: "In
determining good character, the Commission will adopt two fundamental principles: the overriding need to
maintain public confidence in the standards of the judiciary; and that public confidence will only be maintained
if judicial office holders and those who aspire to such office maintain the highest standards of probity in their
professional, public and private lives . . . ." Baroness Prashar, Chairman, Jud. Appointments Comm'n, Middle
Temple Guest Lecture 10 (Nov. 6, 2006), available at http://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/static/
documents/JACSpeechMiddleTempleGuestLecture_061106.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
7. See Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice, High Court of Australia, Public Confidence in the Courts 7
(keynote address and paper delivered at "Confidence in the Courts" Conference Feb. 9-11, 2007), available at
http://www.hcourt.gov.aulspeeches/cj/cj-9feb07.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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practical slippage when it comes to what exactly we want public confidence to be
in. Is it in the primary decisionmaking work of the judiciary, or is it in the
regulation of judicial conduct (or, more particularly, misconduct) itself? There
are, of course, close connections between the two, but the more precise we can be
on this question, the better we may understand the efforts at and the effects of
reform.
This Article focuses on the goal of public confidence as it is promoted in a
variety of common law countries, examining the various approaches to achieving
public confidence and what those approaches may tell us about the meaning and
importance of this goal. It further considers whether the goal as illuminated by
the practical approaches bears any real relationship to the important substance of
judicial ethics.' Others have already explored the concept of public confidence in
the regulation of judicial conduct in United States,' but one potential application
of this exploration of the handling of this concept in other judiciary systems may
be to provide background for further work on the goal of judicial confidence at
home, and to see how we might be further served by similar innovations in our
own systems, both state and federal.'o
Public confidence is not the only concern in the regulation of judicial
conduct, but it has in many instances been set explicitly ahead of other concerns
in the regulation of judicial conduct, which makes it worthy of close
8. The purpose of this article is not primarily to compare directly one system to another to examine the
viability of different efforts to promote public confidence in the context of those other systems. Instead it
examines their approaches independently and looks at the nuts and bolts of various mechanisms, whether
substantive or procedural, to see what "public confidence" means in these contexts.
9. See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts in an Age of Individual
Rights and Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA (Keith
J. Bybee ed., 2007) (exploring the history of efforts in the United States to regulate the judiciary for impartiality
and public confidence); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE 21st CENTURY JUDICIARY 10 (2003) (giving recommendations on how to increase public confidence in the
judiciary).
10. Public confidence is well established as a concern both of the ABA and the United States federal
judiciary, so these discussions of public confidence should have some comparative value. For instance, the
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2007), requires conduct that promotes public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary, and the comments to several other rules show this concern is shot through the
basic understanding of what the rules are for. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007); see also id. at
Preamble, R. 1.2 cmts 1, 3, & 6, R. 2.1 cmt 2, R. 2.4 cmt 1, R. 2.7 cmt 1, R. 2.12 cmt 2, R. 2.16 cmt 1, R. 3.6
cmt 1, R. 4.1 cmt 3 (citing concerns for "public confidence" in the judiciary). In the 2008 Code of Conduct for
United States Judges and the procedures for implementation of those rules, there are similar indications. CODE
OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon 1 commentary, Canon 2A and commentary, Canon 3(A)(6) commentary,
Canon 4F (2008); see also RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS, Judicial
Conference of the United States at §§3(h)(2) & cmt., 23(a), 26 cmt., 27 cmt. (2008). Much has been written in
the wake of the Breyer Report and the adoption of these new rules and procedures about improvements to
transparency and remaining questions about the identity of the decision-makers. See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman,
When Judges are Accused: An Initial Look at the New Federal Judicial Misconduct Rules, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 325 (2008); David Pimentel, The Reluctant Tattletale: Closing the Gap in Federal
Judicial Discipline, 76 TENN. L. REv. 909 (2009). However, there are many other facets to public confidence as
understood and sought in other countries, from which United States observers may learn.
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examination." All of the systems examined here note the importance of the same
basic qualities in the judiciary, and all of them are subject to further questions of
definition: independence, impartiality, integrity, and good behavior. 2 This Article
explores the regulation of those qualities only insofar as they bear directly on
questions of public confidence.
H. UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
As one indication of the centrality of the promotion of public confidence in
the development or formalization of judicial conduct regulation in recent years in
common law countries around the globe, one may look to the statements of
purpose or guiding principles in the black letter of the documents establishing the
codes, procedures, and governing bodies for these systems. For example, the
Australian Guide to Judicial Conduct, under the heading of "Guiding Principles,"
establishes the following priorities:
The principles applicable to judicial conduct have three main objectives:
[t]o uphold public confidence in the administration of justice; [t]o
enhance public respect for the institution of the judiciary; and [to] protect
the reputation of individual judicial officers and of the judiciary. Any
course of conduct that has the potential to put these objectives at risk
must therefore be very carefully considered and, as far as possible,
avoided."
11. This concern is not unique to systems outside of the United States. United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence reveals a wide variety of indications that public confidence in the judiciary is at a premium, not
just in conduct regulation, but more broadly considered in the role of the judge and of the judiciary as an
institution. In what may be the most well-known reference to public confidence in the judiciary in Supreme
Court jurisprudence, Justice Frankfurter once wrote: "The Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor
the sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be
nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by
abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This concern underscores the possibility that whatever we can
learn by looking at the treatment of public confidence in other countries may be useful in improving U.S. efforts
in this area.
12. See generally AUSTRALASIAN INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. INC., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL CONDUCT 1 (2d
ed.), available at http://www.aija.org.aulonline/GuidetoJudicialConduct(2ndEd).pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2010)
[hereinafter AUSTRALIAN GUIDE] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (offering "practical guidance" to
members of the judiciary); ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 4 (noting what is expected of Canadian judges);
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF ENGLAND & WALES, GUIDE TO JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2008 Supp.), available at
http:www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/judges-counciljudicialconduct-updateO408.pdf [hereinafter ENGLAND &
WALES GUIDE] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting the standards of judicial conduct in Britain);
COURTS OF NEW ZEALAND, GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL CONDUCT, available at http://www.courtsofnz.govt.
nzlbusiness/guidelines/guidelines-for-judicial-conduct/Guidelines-for-Judicial-Conduct.pdf (last visited Aug. 2,
2010) [hereinafter NEW ZEALAND GUIDELINES] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing judicial
conduct guidelines for the New Zealand judiciary).
13. AUSTRALIAN GUIDE, supra note 12, at 3.
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Along similar lines, the Act creating New Zealand's Judicial Conduct
Commissioner states that its purpose "is to enhance public confidence in, and to
protect the impartiality and integrity of, the judicial system .... The Canadian
Judicial Council is "committed to fostering ongoing confidence in the
judiciary."" Parliament created the Office for Judicial Complaints for the
Judiciary of England & Wales to "support[] the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief
Justice in their joint responsibility to maintain public confidence in members of
the judiciary." 6
What is this public confidence that is so important to achieve and maintain?
How would one determine its presence, absence, or extent? Why is public
confidence in the judiciary an important goal? And again, what is this confidence
supposed to be in? One Australian commentator has asked whether we are even
certain that public confidence in the judiciary is necessarily a good thing." Will
people have greater confidence if they do or do not know "how the sausage is
made"? One more or less universal complication is that it is difficult to talk in a
meaningful way about public confidence in the judiciary when so few people
really pay any attention to the judiciary, except perhaps when something
scandalous shows up in the newspaper." Many things that bear on meaningful
public confidence in theory are in practice of little apparent interest to the general
public (and of course there is still the problem of defining "the public").'9 "Much
of what we call public confidence consists of taking things for granted." 20 Former
long-time Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, Murray Gleeson, has
14. Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, § 4 (N.Z.), available at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2004/0038/4.0/viewpdf.aspx (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) [hereinafter
Judicial Conduct Act 2004] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
15. CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, MANAGING CHANGE: THE 2008-2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL 4, available at http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/CJC-annual-report-
2008-2009-finalE.pdf [hereinafter CJC 2008-2009ANNUAL REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
16. OFFICE FOR JUDICIAL COMPLAINTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2008-2009 7, available at http://www.judicial
complaints.gov.uk/docs/OJCAnnualReport_2008_-_2009.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) [hereinafter OJC
2008-2009 ANNUAL.REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
17. Greg Woods, Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Historical Observations, and a Proposal I
(paper delivered at the "Confidence in the Courts" Conference Feb. 9-11, 2007), available at http://njca.anu.
edu.aulProfessional%20Development/programs%20by%20year/2007/Confidence%20courts/papers/Woods.pdf
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
18. This concern is illuminated by the political reality in the United States, of what Professor Geyh has
called the "Axiom of 80" regarding public interest and participation in the judicial election process: "(1)
Roughly 80% of the public prefers to select its judges by election and does so; (2) Roughly 80% of the
electorate does not vote in judicial elections; (3) Roughly 80% of the electorate cannot identify the candidates
for judicial office; and (4) Roughly 80% of the public believes that when judges are elected, their decisions are
influenced by the campaign contributions they receive." Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 52 (2003). When the public has the opportunity to participate directly in the shaping of the
judiciary, and yet apparently know and care so little, what can be expected for education and interest levels in
other contexts in which that level of participation is not even invited?
19. Gleeson fears the "silent majority" is not heard as "the public" on these matters. Gleeson, supra note
7, at 6; see also Woods, supra note 17, at 1.
20. Gleeson, supra note 7, at 2. Gleeson draws a comparison here with the unquestioning but ultimately
ignorant Australian belief in the integrity of the electoral process. Id. at 2-3.
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questioned the usefulness of a focus on public confidence, suggesting that it is
insufficiently observable (and insufficiently understood) to serve as a reliable
21
measure.
"Public confidence" might refer to the degree to which the average
reasonable person is satisfied with the job performance of the judiciary, either as
individuals or as a group. But the average reasonable person knows little about
judicial performance or what it means to fulfill the obligations of the judicial
role. After all, even among those who pay close attention to, or even play the
judicial role, there is much disagreement about how to characterize the
obligations and proscriptions of the judicial role.
"Public confidence" might mean, on the other hand, something more like
"customer satisfaction," in which case one might ask whether the average
person-either a direct consumer of judicial services or just a citizen-observer
affected secondhand by the judge's work-believes that judges are doing their
jobs the way those consumers believe the job ought to be done. This option
obviously layers in yet further problems of uncertainty and inconsistency.
Presumably public confidence cannot simply be coextensive with popular
opinion about whether a judge made the correct decision in a particular case. 22 If
the primary concern were to capture public approval or agreement as to actual
decisionmaking, one might reasonably imagine that the public would be more
directly involved in decisionmaking, either on appeal or in the process of judicial
discipline. If public confidence were truly about responsiveness to the
"consumer" of judicial services, then perhaps there should be a regime akin to
jury-duty for public involvement. From the fact that this is not the system in any
of the countries examined here, one possible conclusion to be drawn is that
public confidence cannot be properly understood as directly based on what the
public would decide or how the public expects judges to behave.
There is surely a difference between public confidence and popularity.
Judges should be able to make unpopular decisions without risking a lack of
public confidence, and should not make popular decisions simply to try to win
public confidence.23 There are complaints from some corners about judges being
"out of touch" with the public, but it is unclear exactly what that means, or how
and why judges need to be "in touch" with the public in order to instill or
maintain public confidence in their work.24
Still, the involvement and the education of the public are not irrelevant to a
meaningful understanding of public confidence. Continued public participation in
the judicial systems, it is argued, may promote acceptability of decisions. Indeed,
21. Id.
22. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (1788).
23. See, e.g., NEw ZEALAND GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 1 61; Gleeson, supra note 7, at 7.
24. David Brown, Popular Punitiveness, the Rise of the 'Public Voice' and Other Challenges to Judicial
Legitimacy 5-6 (paper delivered at the "Confidence in the Courts" Conference Feb.9-11, 2007) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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some associate the decline in use of juries in Australia (and thus the decline in
participation of members of the public in the work of the judiciary) with a loss of
public confidence in the judiciary." This raises the question of whether public
confidence is in fact a matter of understanding or acceptability of decisions, or
even perhaps what it means to talk about the "acceptability of decisions" in this
context. A February 2009 press release from the judiciary of England & Wales
presents a pertinent angle on acceptability of decisions when it states: "Fewer
than 1% of all convictions in the Crown Court and just 1.3% of sentences are
successfully appealed in the Court of Appeal, which should increase public
confidence in the Criminal Justice System."26 One might question the logic of this
statement, but the underlying concern for promoting the idea of public
confidence is clear. There is perhaps a more meaningful connection between
cogent, reasoned opinions explaining outcomes and the acceptability of decisions
than there is between actual participation in the process and acceptability of
decisions. However, with a public that does not, for the most part, read actual
court opinions, perhaps participation is the more effective mechanism for
promotion of public confidence, at least insofar as it promotes awareness of the
work done by the judiciary.
Some of the regimes discussed in this Article put substantial emphasis on the
basic connection between public confidence and information. For example, this is
largely the driving force behind recent movement in the judiciary of England &
Wales, and Australian courts now have public information officers, not just for
27
managing crises, but for regular educational purposes. Some suggest an even
more extensive use of such a system, in arranging for retired judges or academics
to be available to comment on decisions, rather than leaving criticism, informed
or otherwise, to whoever can shout the loudest and the soonest after a decision is
handed down.28 One writer suggests a trend in Australia running from an initial
demystification of the judiciary through to the development of a lack of respect
for the judiciary.29 Some of this may result from the decline of the work of juries
in Australia, and some from the reality that news coverage is much more
extensive today than it was a generation ago, but it is still the case that
newsworthy items about judges are unlikely to be those that instill confidence-it
is the scandals that will be reported.o In any event, the discussion below will
illuminate just how prominently the questions about availability of information
25. See Gleeson, supra note 7, at 3-4.
26. Press Release, Judicial Commc'ns Office, Court of Appeal Contributes to Public Confidence in the
Criminal Justice System (Jan. 19, 2009), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/media-releases/
2009/news-release-0209 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
27. Gleeson, supra note 7, at 4.
28. Woods, supra note 17, at 11.
29. Brown, supra note 24, at 2-3.
30. Id. at 1 (noting the rise of the "public voice" and the decline of expertise of those who are speaking
out, suggesting challenges will only increase for maintaining public confidence in the courts); see also Gleeson,
supra note 7, at 5-6.
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feature in the regulation of judicial conduct in efforts to promote public
confidence." This is one of the areas in which the slippage occurs on the question
of public confidence in what, exactly.
In short, invocations of the term "public confidence" tend to be fairly
ambiguous, and it is not even clear that there is one consistent understanding of
the term, but a careful look at the ways in which different systems attempt to
promote it may help present a clearer understanding of the term itself and why
the concept matters. If a clear and useful understanding emerges, and if it can be
shown to match up well with specific mechanisms to achieve it, that will help the
continuing shaping of the mechanisms to do so even more effectively. On the
other hand, if the understanding does not coalesce clearly or does not connect up
well with the mechanisms developed so far to achieve the ends of public
confidence, it will be easier to redirect those efforts.
Whatever regulatory steps may be taken to foster greater public confidence in
the judiciary, it will always be hard to measure their success.32 However, the
better we can at least grasp a definition of public confidence, the better the means
can be connected with the ends, and in turn, the more we may be able to trust that
there are effective measures in place to promote this value on which these
systems place so much emphasis, however difficult it may be to measure. This
Article examines some of these regulatory efforts abroad, both to better
understand what "public confidence" means in practice and to see what
substantive and procedural mechanisms and approaches are best designed to
promote or even achieve the kind of confidence that will be most meaningful.
III. SYSTEMS AND METHODS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT REGULATION IN FOUR
COMMON LAW COUNTRIES
It will be useful at this point to provide a basic description of the current state
of the developing systems, both substantive and procedural, in each of the
countries discussed in this Article. In order to fit so many systems into the same
frame for examination, these descriptions are necessarily general overviews, and
where there are both federal or national and state, provincial, or territorial court
systems in the same country, the focus here is only on the federal or national
system in that country.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. Some have, in various ways and in various settings, made efforts to measure public confidence in
certain aspects of the work of the judiciary, through polling or other assessments of quantifiable data, but none
measure precisely the angle of public confidence that this article explores. However, for measurements of
related concepts, see, e.g., Mike Hough et al., Scientific Indicators of Confidence in Justice: Tools for Policy
Assessment (2009), available at http://www.eurojustis.eu/fotoweb/22.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (reporting on research on development of survey-based indicators of public confidence in justice in EU
member states); James W. Stoutenborough & Donald P. Haider-Markel, Public Confidence in the U.S. Supreme
Court: A New Look at the Impact of Court Decisions, 45 Soc. Sci. J. 28 (2008) (analyzing relationship between
specific Court decisions and public confidence, using data on public opinion).
185
2010 /Promoting Public Confidence in the Regulation of Judicial Conduct
A. Canada
Canada has been at the work of regulating judicial discipline in a formal way
for longer than some of the other countries discussed here. Parliament created the
Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) in 1971, giving it authority over federally
appointed members of the judiciary." The CJC first published an aspirational
guide to judicial conduct in Canada called Ethical Principles for Judges in
1998.34 Complaints about judicial conduct are typically dealt with by some
combination of the relevant Chief Judge and the relevant judicial council." In the
CJC process, the only official sanction available for misconduct is removal from
the bench, and the CJC cannot actually impose that sanction itself, but rather it
has to make a recommendation to the Minister of Justice, who may proceed
through Parliament to do So.
Reported cases from the CJC dealing with misconduct of federal judges are
relatively rare, as there is an apparent strong preference for voluntary
resignations from the bench in the face of conduct complaints with any merit.17
Over the past ten years, an average of 168 conduct complaints have been filed
with the CJC each year. " Yet anecdotal perspectives on the Canadian judicial
ethics scene indicate some frustration with the preference for sweeping ethics
problems under the rug through resignations. There is great confidence in the
appointment process, but not necessarily in the discipline process. Of course, the
two are logically connected. If judges are well-chosen for their positions, there
would presumably be less call for complaint. Further, if judges are known to be
well chosen for their positions, there will be less suspicion about whether there
ought to be more complaints. This focus of energy on the appointment process
rather than the discipline process, along with the relative paucity of opinions
from the CJC on judicial conduct issues and the preference for resignations rather
than going through the process, seems to indicate that the public confidence
sought by the CJC mechanisms is truly confidence in the work of the institution
33. See generally CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca./english/index.en.asp (last
visited Aug. 2, 2010) [hereinafter CJC Website] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). There are also ten
provincial and territorial judicial councils. Id.
34. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 4.
35. See CJC Website, supra note 33.
36. Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1, Part II, §§ 65, 69, available at http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.cal
english/about en.asp?selMenu=about mp judgesact.en.asp (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Some
provincial councils explicitly state their power to impose lesser sanctions on their own. See, e.g., PROVINCIAL
COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, http://www.provincialcourt.bc.ca/printthispage/complaint process.html (last
visited Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Low Review); ONTARIO JUDICIAL COUNCIL, THIRTEENTH
ANNUAL REPORT: 2007-2008 5, available at http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/ojc/en/annualreportl 07-08.pdf
(last visited Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Low Review).
37. The CJC website lists reports and decisions from only eight inquiry committees dating back to 1990.
CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, Inquiry Committee Decisions, http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.calenglish/conduct-
en.asp?selMenu=conduct-inquiry en.asp (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
38. See CJC 2008-2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 16.
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of the judiciary as a whole, rather than confidence in the process of regulating
judicial conduct.
B. Australia
There is a guide to judicial conduct for federal judges9 in Australia, written
in 2002, but it is wholly aspirational.4 Rather more importantly, there is currently
no standard national complaints-handling system or procedure, which has
prompted calls for reform over the past few years. Most recently, these calls for
reform have resulted in the creation of a set of recommendations from the
Australian Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee.4' The Law
Council of Australia has come out against the suggested changes to current
practices, first on grounds that the current practices are not broken, and therefore
do not require repair, and second on the ground of concern about the
constitutional viability of any such system (which is thought to threaten judicial
independence).42  What exists at present is an informal system of private
management of judicial conduct by the heads of jurisdiction, and when there is
something so significant that it might rise to the level of the need for removal, it
is up to Parliament to create an ad hoc procedure for investigating and making a
decision about whether to remove the judge.43 When such Parliamentary
investigations have occurred in the past, they have created something of a media
circus each time.' Some perspectives on the Australian judicial ethics scene
indicate frustration with the lack of information about what is really going on-
39. States and territories also have their own judiciaries and some, including most notably New South
Wales, have much more fully developed formal regulation of judicial conduct than the current federal system.
See generally JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF NEW SOUTH WALES, http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/ (last visited
Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Peter A. Sallman, Judicial Conduct: Still a
Live Issue? 2 (paper delivered to the Judicial Conference of Australia Sept. 3, 2005) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (noting well developed system in NSW and developing system in Victoria). However, here I will
focus here on the federal judiciary in Australia.
40. AUSTRALIAN GUIDE, supra note 12, at 1 ("The purpose of this publication is to give practical
guidance to members of the Australian judiciary at all levels.").
41. See PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, AUSTRALIA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF JUDGES (Dec.
9, 2009), available at http://www.aph. gov.aulsenate/committee/legconctte/judicial-systen/report/index.htm
[hereinafter AUSTRALIAN SENATE REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (set of recommendations
from Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee); see also Chris Merritt, Federal Body to Handle
Complaints, THE AUSTRALIAN, June 20, 2008.
42. See LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, INQUIRY INTO AUSTRALIA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF
JUDGES 3 (Apr. 30, 2009) ("While supporting the development of independent and transparent mechanisms for
dealing with judicial complaints, the Law council sees no need for and is not in favor of a national judicial
complaints handling system."). There are similar indications of resistance to change, for similar reasons, in the
area of judicial appointments. See, e.g., Philip Ruddock, Confidence in the Courts 20, 30 (paper delivered at the
"Confidence in the Courts" Conference Feb. 9-11, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
43. See AUSTRALIAN SENATE REPORT, supra note 41, at § 7.2.
44. See, e.g., Sallman, supra note 39, at 13; ENID CAMPBELL & H.P. LEE, THE AUSTRALIAN JUDICIARY
101-131 (2001); H.P. Lee and V. Morabito, Removal of Judges-The Australian Experience, SING. J. LEGAL
STUD. 40 (1992).
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that "out of sight, out of mind" is not the right approach and cannot be counted
on to mean that Australian judges really behave better than other judges.45 The
Senate Committee recommendations include, most importantly, proposals for the
adoption of a written complaint handling policy to be made publicly available on
the Intemet," and for the regular publication by all federal courts of a quarterly
complaint handling summary status (without personal details to identify the
judicial officers in question).47 One of the intriguing features of the committee
report is that it is not explicitly couched in terms of concern for public
confidence, although that term is sprinkled throughout the report in quotations
48from the commentary of those whose views the Committee took into account.
As the system currently stands, Australia is perhaps the most overt in its
expression of public confidence as a basic guiding principle when it comes to the
substance of judicial conduct standards in its written guide. As noted above, the
Australian Guide to Judicial Conduct establishes three primary objectives:
"[upholding] public confidence in the administration of justice, [enhancing]
public respect for the institution of the judiciary[,] and [protecting] the reputation
of individual judicial officers and the judiciary." 49 These objectives are not about
regulating conduct with an eye to achieving actually just outcomes, but rather
about maintaining confidence and respect, that is to say, about keeping up
appearances. It is only as a way of aiming at those public confidence goals that
the guide continues: "There are three basic principles against which judicial
conduct should be tested to ensure compliance with the stated objectives. These
are: Impartiality; Judicial Independence; and Integrity and personal behaviour.,50
The guide goes on to provide specific guidance as to conformance of conduct in
those areas that have much in common with codes and guides in other countries,
all shot through with clear concerns for public confidence as explored in the
discussion below." This set-up indicates that in Australia, public confidence is
meant to be in the institution of the judiciary and in its operation, more broadly,
45. In his broad discussion of judicial conduct issues, Prof. Sallman notes:
It has long been assumed, and indeed said from time to time, that the Australian judiciary is a well-
behaved judiciary, both on and off the bench and for that reason conduct issues have not loomed
large as an issue of public policy discussion.... I might say that I was politely rebuked in a couple
of submissions received during the Victorian review for expressing far too sanguine a position on the
state of the nation in relation to judicial conduct issues. Of course as a matter of empirical
knowledge we can never have a clear, authoritative picture of judicial conduct . ... [O]ne has no
way of knowing ... how many complaints there are or what they are about. It is even possible that
removable conduct occurs which for one reason or another is never discovered or revealed.
Sailman, supra note 39, at 8-9.
46. AUSTRALIAN SENATE REPORT, supra note 41, at §2.9. For further relevant (and more specific)
recommendations see id. at §§ 7.82-7.83.
47. Id. §§2.19-2.20.
48. Id. §§7.19, 7.45, 7.54, 7.72.
49. AUSTRALIAN GUIDE, supra note 12, at 3.
50. Id.
51. Id. passim.
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rather than specifically in its regulation of misconduct. This makes a certain
amount of sense of the current lack of specific or standardized procedures and the
lack of transparency regarding disposition of disciplinary complaints, in that
confidence in the implementation of oversight is simply not the intended focus.
C. England & Wales
The judiciary of England & Wales has a written Guide to Judicial Conduct,5 2
but it is not binding due to concern about how that might threaten judicial
independence." The Introduction to the guide indicates that it was created, at
least in some large measure, as a response to the creation of similar codes
elsewhere at the time. The judiciary of England & Wales is perhaps the most
overt about seeking public confidence directly in its process of judicial conduct
regulation, rather that confidence more generally in the work of the judiciary as a
whole. In 2006, the Office for Judicial Complaints (OJC) was created first and
foremost to "support[] the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice in their joint
responsibility to maintain public confidence in members of the judiciary."55 The
OJC works on the investigations and make recommendations but ultimately the
Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice make the final decisions.6 The OJC
is further tasked with providing "efficient and effective customer friendly
services."" The first two annual reports from the OJC referred to its "customers"
and "stakeholders," but that language has largely disappeared now from the
website and the most recent annual report.58 For some perspective on the work of
the OJC, of the nearly 900 complaints filed against mainstream judges in the
2007-2008 reporting year, only one resulted in any discipline, and that was only a
reprimand. 9 During the 2008-2009 reporting year, total complaints were down by
seven percent, and of 870 complaints against the mainstream judiciary, seventeen
resulted in disciplinary action.W
52. ENGLAND & WALES GUIDE, supra note 12.
53. Id. at iv, 5.
54. Id. at 1-6.
55. OJC 2008-2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 7; see also The Judicial Discipline (Prescribed
Procedures) Regulations 2006 (2006 No. 676) Part 1, § 3 [hereinafter Judicial Discipline Regulations] (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
56. Judicial Discipline Regulations, supra note 55, at Part 7, § 35(2).
57. OFFICE FOR JUDICIAL COMPLAINTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2006-2007 4, available at http://www.judicial
complaints.gov.uk/docs/OJCAnnualReport 2006-2007.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) [hereinafter OJC 2006-
2007 ANNUAL REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
58. Compare id. and OFFICE FOR JUDICIAL COMPLAINTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2007-2008 5, 10, available
at http://www.judicialcomplaints.gov.uk/docs/OJC-AnnualReport-_07-08.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2010)
[hereinafter OJC 2007-2008 ANNUAL REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review), with OJC 2008-2009
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, and OFFICE FOR JUDICIAL COMPLAINTS, Welcome to the Office of Judicial
Complaints, http://www.judicialcomplaints.gov.uk (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
59. See OJC 2007-2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 19-20.
60. OJC 2008-2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 9, 12.
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As a further signal of the importance of public confidence in the process,
another layer of oversight has been created in the form of an ombudsman for
complaints regarding the disciplinary process as well as the appointments
process." One part of the ombudsman's statutory remit is to review complaints
about the OJC's handling of complaints.62 The gist of the ombudsman's work so
far has presented a generally positive view of the work and the continued
improvements of the OJC.6 1 So, on the side of public confidence in the
monitoring of judicial conduct, there is the fact that these offices exist, that they
are not run by judges (i.e. insiders), and that they are well-publicized, as are their
processes.
Great strides have been made in terms of transparency of the process and
even of some outcomes, but even so, there is perhaps still room for improvement,
if the goal is confidence in the disciplinary process. Though more information is
available now than in the past,' very little substantive non-statistical information
that comes out of this process is made available to the public. Statements are
released by the OJC when the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice make a
decision of some kind, but they contain very little information about what
conduct was at issue, in what factual circumstances, and what reasoning went
into the decision.6 ' The OJC's annual report details statistics regarding the
number of complaints filed and some basic information about what categories
they fell into (how many reprimands and removals there were at each level of the
judiciary, etc.), but even this information is very rudimentary . Without facts or
reasoning, it is difficult to know what can be taken from this information. In the
two most recent annual reports, there were four case studies giving different
simple scenarios in which complaints were brought that resulted in discipline.
This is a step forward, but the examples are still so brief that it is hard to reach a
clear understanding of the reasoning behind the decisions.
61. See generally JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS & CONDUCT OMBUDSMAN, http://www.judicialombudsman.
gov.uk/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
62. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS & CONDUCT OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL REPORT 2008-09 6, available at
http://www.judicialombudsman.gov.uk/docs/JACOAnnualReport2008-09.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
63. See id. at 4, 12.
64. For example, an Op-Ed. from several years ago complained about several specific areas of desired
improvements. See Robert Verkaik, Op-Ed., Bring Judicial Misconduct into the Open, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Mar. 28, 2007, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crimellegal-opinion-bring-
judicial-misconduct-into-the-open-446892.html. Several of those areas of concern have recently been addressed
and improved, at least as to the names of the judges involved.
65. Examples of these briefs statements are available on the OJC website. See OFFICE FOR JUDICIAL
COMPLAINTS, Press Releases and Statements, http://www.judicialcomplaints.gov.uk/publications/news.htm (last
visited Aug. 2,20 10) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
66. See OJC 2008-2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 9-13.
67. See id. at 14-15; OJC 2007-2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 36-37.
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The press release for the 2008-2009 Annual Report announced some relevant
improvements.68 For example, going forward, whenever a judge is removed from
office, a public statement will be made.69 (Those remain cursory at best.) More
significantly, perhaps, with regard to public confidence concerns, it says this:
"For the first time this annual report includes the number of judicial office
holders who resign during an investigation. This increased openness should help
the public to have confidence that all complaints about the conduct of judicial
office holders are investigated thoroughly."o The annual report also touts the fact
that "U]udicial discipline matters are now more transparent and open and
extensive information about complaints and the complaint process as a whole is
now available."" One might dispute the characterization of the information as
"extensive" but certainly it is more than the complete lack of information
previously available to the public.
While it appears that the practical efforts at reform in England & Wales have
largely focused on promotion of public confidence in the regulatory oversight
mechanism itself, there is of course a connection or a translation from that
concern to concern for public confidence in the quality of the judiciary and its
work more generally. If judicial conduct is being efficiently policed, then
presumably what remains is worthy of confidence. The only risk in this approach
is that by focusing on rooting out misconduct, one publicizes the misconduct
rather than the high quality work, and thus creates more negative associations
than may be useful.
D. New Zealand
Until recently, although New Zealand courts in fact had a document called
Guidelines for Judicial Conduct, it was not known or available to the public.72
Those guidelines are now available on the Internet." Language in a recent
opinion from the Supreme Court of New Zealand makes clear that the guidelines
68. Press Release, Office for Judicial Complaints, Office for Judicial Complaints Publishes 2008-2009
Annual Report (Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.judicialcomplaints.gov.uk/docs/OJCAnnual-Repor
t_2008-2009_Press_StatementFinal_24_02_10.pdf [hereinafter Press Release, OJC 2008-2009 Annual Report]
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. OJC 2008-2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 7.
72. See, e.g., Saxmere Co. Ltd. v Wool Bd. Disestablishment Co. Ltd. (2009) NZSC 122 (SC 64/2007), at
1 5; Miguel Demapan, Pacific Experience with Codes of Conduct 4 (2007), available at http://www.
paclii.org/PJDP/resources/PJC/PacificExperience-withCodesofConducts.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2010)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
73. NEw ZEALAND GUIDELINES, supra note 12. The guidelines are now available online. They were first
adopted in 2003 but the edition available on the website is from 2005. Id. The courts' website indicates that they
"are expressed to be guidance to judges, not rules ..... Id. No information is readily available to explain why
these were previously unavailable or why they have been made public, so the public is left to speculate. There is
some possibility of a connection with a recent controversy over a prominent refusal to recuse. See discussion
infra at notes 115-119 and accompanying text.
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provide guidance only, not rules to be strictly imposed.7 4 As to procedure, a 2004
Act of Parliament created the office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner (JCC)
to address concerns about public confidence in the judiciary." By contrast to the
OJC in England & Wales, the office in New Zealand is held by a single person
rather than a number of civil servants. After consultation with the Chief Justice,
"(the Commissioner is appointed by the Governor-General on the
recommendation of the House of Representatives."7  There have been two
Commissioners since the establishment of the office in 2005, both of them
lawyers in private practice. In late March 2010, Parliament passed an amended
version of the Act, which now provides for the appointment of a Deputy
Commissioner as well.
All complaints about judicial conduct are initially directed to the
Commissioner.0 The Commissioner decides whether to dismiss a complaint on
any of a number of enumerated grounds.8' If the Commissioner does not dismiss
the complaint, he may choose either to refer the complaint to the relevant head of
bench 82 or to recommend that the Attorney General establish a Judicial Conduct
Panel." A Judicial Conduct Panel would include judges (active or retired) and a
lay member.84 In the years since the establishment of the JCC, only ten of 438
complaints filed have been referred to a head of bench, and no judicial conduct
panels have been established." All other complaints have either been dismissed
or are still pending." There is at least anecdotal concern that some legitimate
complaints are never actually made, due to the realities of practice before judges
in such a relatively small legal community. There is thus concern that minor
conduct problems in New Zealand simply fall through the cracks.
The Public Issues Committee of the Auckland District Law Society issued a
paper in late 2007 on judicial conduct issues, showing a particular concern that
74. Saxmere Co. Ltd., 2009 NZSC 122 at I 11; see also NEW ZEALAND GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 2.
75. JUDICIAL CONDUCT ACT 2004, supra note 14, at § 4.
76. See id. § 7(1).
77. Id. §§ 7(2)-(3).
78. See OFFICE OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSIONER, http://www.jcc.govt.nz/template.asp?
folder-COMPLAINT PROCESS (last visited Aug. 12, 2010) [hereinafter JCC Website] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).The first Judicial Conduct Commissioner was Ian Haynes, a practicing attorney in a
private firm. He was replaced in 2009 by Sir David Gascoigne, who is now a consultant to his former firm. Id.
79. Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Amendment Act 2010, §§8A-B (N.Z.)
[hereinafter Judicial Conduct Amendment Act 2010] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
80. See Judicial Conduct Act 2004, supra note 14, at §§ 8, 11.
81. Id. § 16.
82. Id. § 17.
83. Id. § 18.
84. Id. § 22.
85. OFFICE OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSIONER, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2008/2009 4, available at
http://www.jec.govt.nz/pdf/annual-report-08-09.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) [hereinafter JCC ANNUAL
REPORT 2008/2009] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
86. Id.
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the JCC system was not designed effectively to deal "with cases of relatively
minor judicial misconduct, such as rudeness to counsel or parties."" The paper
advocates greater openness about sanctions imposed." The law society paper also
advocates further public debate over how best to deal with misconduct "in a
manner which preserves confidence in the system."' 9 It is not entirely clear to an
outside observer whether the confidence desired in New Zealand is for the work
of the judiciary more broadly or the system of conduct regulation in particular,
but there are at least indicators of the former.
The original Commissioner raised several practical difficulties he
encountered in implementing the procedures and principles prescribed in the Act.
For example, he sought direction for handling, or an alternative mechanism for
handling, complaints in those instances in which the Commissioner has a conflict
of interest." This is a legitimate and particularly problematic question in such a
small legal community. From the creation of the office, the Commissioner simply
had to do his best not to be affected by the conflict of interest, but now the 2010
Amendment Act addresses this concern by providing for the appointment of a
Deputy Commissioner who can handle complaints in such situations.
In summary, although New Zealand has established procedures for the
Judicial Conduct Commissioner to follow when dealing with a complaint, no
Commissioner has yet actually used the more innovative aspects of those
procedures, in particular the one that might have most bearing on the promotion
of public confidence. The potential benefit to public confidence of having the
multi-faceted panel (that is, of having a lay member and other "outsiders"
involved) is lost if those outsiders are never used to play this role.
Furthermore, New Zealand's Guidelines for Judicial Conduct were not
known or available to the public until 2009, which seems an odd approach with
respect to public confidence. Perhaps the failure to make the code public from the
outset simply indicates a lesser concern with confidence in the regulatory process
and a greater focus on the primary decisionmaking work of the judiciary. The
situation has, at any rate, been remedied to the extent that the guidelines are now
publicly available, but one still does have to look hard to find them.
In terms of public information available, there is little that is of any
meaningful use in determining what constitutes judicial misconduct in practice in
New Zealand, or why, what the ramifications for any particular misconduct
87. Auckland District Law Society: Public Issues Committee, Judicial Conduct ii (Nov. 14, 2007)
(discussion paper), available at https://www.adls.org.nz/about-adls/committees/public-issues-committee/public-
issue-papers (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
88. Id. at 5-6 ("[A] judicial officer is fulfilling a public office in the day-to-day administration of justice.
This character does not lend itself to secrecy.").
89. Id. at ii.
90. See OFFICE OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSIONER, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2006/2007 6,
available at http://www.jcc.govt.nz/pdf/annualreport0607.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) [hereinafter JCC
ANNUAL REPORT 2006/2007] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
91. Judicial Conduct Amendment Act 2010, supra note 79, at §§8A-B.
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found would be, and so on. The only public information available on judicial
misconduct comes in annual reports from the Judicial Conduct Commissioner,
who provides only the barest statistics such as numbers of complaints filed,
numbers of complaints dismissed on various enumerated grounds, numbers of
complaints referred to a head of bench, and numbers of complaints carried over
into the next year.92 This lack of detailed information may indicate again the
extent to which confidence is not specifically sought for the process of regulation
itself. The process in New Zealand seems to be merely a backup device to
promote public confidence in the judiciary as a whole, through a showing or
offering of basic oversight.
With this general overview in mind, of how these four national judicial
systems operate in terms of regulation of judicial conduct, we turn next to a
closer examination of the specific aspects of these models that bear most
significantly on public confidence.
IV. THEMES EMERGING FROM THESE APPROACHES
Looking at these basic aspects of design in systems purporting to aim at
public confidence, several themes emerge as important. First, there appears to be
some general correlation between the target of the desired confidence and the
emphasis and shape of various aspects of judicial conduct regulation. Where
confidence is sought primarily in the judicial system as a broader whole, there is
less focus on process and transparency and more reliance on big picture
underlying policy in the codes or guiding principles. Process, in these systems, is
only a mechanism to further those underlying values. Where process and
transparency are more central, the emphasis appears to lie more on the desire for
confidence in the oversight mechanisms themselves. It is not entirely clear
whether this is unintended slippage from an original focus on confidence in the
judiciary as a whole, or whether it is an intentional shift. Whatever the intent at
the outset, a system's treatment of a variety of factors, both substantive and
procedural, come together to achieve varying potential levels of confidence in the
whole and in the regulations of conduct.
In the next section, this Article examines some of the most pertinent of these
factors, how they play into the various systems at issue, and what public
confidence ends are or might be furthered by the implementation of particular
approaches to some important questions. The discussion that follows is divided
generally into two major categories-substantive factors and procedural factors.
In the discussion of substantive factors, topics include the existence and
availability of a code or guide, the use of appearance standards, standards for
"integrity," handling of impartiality in demeanor and extrajudicial speech,
possibilities for side-stepping the process through apologies or resignations, and
92. JCC ANNUAL REPORT 2008/2009, supra note 85, at 4-6.
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potential pitfalls of high thresholds for discipline or removal. In the discussion of
factors related to process, topics include the existence of established and
consistent procedures known to the public, the identity of decisionmakers and
others involved in the regulatory process, the official and practical powers of the
decisionmakers, and transparency and publicity related to misconduct. In all of
these matters, this Article examines how the treatment of these key factors
connects with the achievement of the goal of promoting public confidence in the
judiciary, and in some instances, whether further innovations might be possible
or advisable.
A. Substantive Factors in Regulation of Judicial Conduct
1. Codes and Guides
At this point, all of the countries examined here have a written code or guide
of some kind. The codes or guides tend to be limited to providing guidance rather
than binding authority. In at least one case, this is due to concerns about how a
binding code would infringe on judicial independence.93 This presents an
interesting question of "independence from what?" that is an interesting problem
in its own right with regard to public confidence. Of course, having a written
code or guide, even if it is meant only as aspirational guidance and not as binding
authority, sends an important message to the public that there are clear
expectations about judicial conduct, which serves both to educate the public
about the judicial role and to assure the public that there is concern about
regulating the substance of judicial conduct.
It is unclear, for example, why the New Zealand code was initially kept a
secret among judges, but it is possible that the reasoning is along the lines of
what initially prevented the development of a code in the United States. When
the initial development of a judicial code was considered in 1908, there were
concerns that the introduction of such a code would send a message that there
was a problem with judicial misconduct that was in particular need of correction,
which would undermine, rather than promote, confidence in the judiciary.94 Such
concerns have become somewhat obsolete now that the code in New Zealand is
publicly available, but the question remains, on the subject of content and
emphasis, as to what messages a code may send to the public about realistic
concerns for misconduct.
At this point, there appears to be agreement that having some form of written
guidance and making that available to the public is good for public confidence
both in the system as a whole and in the practice of conduct regulation. Therefore
we turn now to the most relevant aspects of the substance of that guidance in
93. ENGLAND & WALES GUIDE, supra note 12, at iv; ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 3.
94. See Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence, supra note 9, at 27.
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order to assess what they may reveal about understandings of and approaches to
public confidence in the judiciaries of these other common law countries.
2. Appearance Standards
Each of the systems examined indicates in its code or guide some level of
concern for the appearance, as well as the reality of proper judicial conduct."
One of the most common areas in which this concern comes up is that of recusal.
The complication, especially when comparing the analysis across countries, is
that recusal issues walk a blurry line between true judicial conduct matters on the
one hand, and merits-related decisionmaking matters on the other. Each system
examined in this Article is clear about the need to draw this line when it comes to
judicial conduct regulation-that a question about whether a judicial decision
was correct is a matter for appeal and not for the disciplinary authority-but in
practice, conduct that might implicate bias or the appearance of bias is often hard
to place clearly in one category or the other.
If allegations about bias are appropriate subjects for the regulatory scheme,
and if the conduct is regulated for the purpose of achieving public confidence,
arguably apparent bias (even if false) would matter as much, if not more, than
actual bias (particularly if that actual bias were unknown). Justice Thomas, in his
account of examples of misconduct in office, says specifically that bias and
prejudice fall into this category, arising out of the concern for impartiality."
Thomas turns directly to the necessity of an appearance standard for assessing
misconduct.7 Former Australian Chief Justice Gleeson suggests that there is no
way that public confidence would exist if people believed impartiality could not
be achieved, 8 but somewhere along the way, the concern shifts from the actual
impartiality that would instill public confidence to the instilling of public
confidence itself, whether it is reflective of the underlying realities or not.99 A
survey of recent cases involving recusal in other countries indicates a variety of
95. See, e.g., NEW ZEALAND GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 3; ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 27;
ENGLAND & WALES GUIDE, supra note 12, at 22-27. This standard is often used in the United States, where
reasoning is more readily available in judicial misconduct cases, as a face-saving measure.
96. HON. JUSTICE JAMES THOMAS, JUDICIAL ETHICS IN AUSTRALIA 51 (2d ed. 1997).
97. The standard Thomas would use for requiring recusal is "if there is any real possibility a reasonable
apprehension [that a judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the deciding of a case] might
result." Id. at 51.
98. See Gleeson, supra note 7, at 5.
99. I have suggested elsewhere that standards based on appearances of impartiality are unreliable, so
will not belabor the point here, except to suggest that such a disconnection is potentially dangerous and
obfuscatory, and that a focus on the provision of reasoning may ultimately provide a more reliable and useful
way of understanding judicial outcomes and ensuring, to the extent possible, the legitimacy of the
decisionmaking process. See generally Sarah M. R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1
(2007); Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an Opportunity for Virtue, 62 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1637 (2005).
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understandings of how appearances may or may not play into concerns for public
confidence. The following examples may shed some light.
The one case from England & Wales in the reporting year 2007-2008 in
which a complaint against a mainstream judge resulted in a public reprimand was
a case involving a judge's refusal to recuse on the basis of appearance of bias.so
As that underlying case unfolded, it became very clear that it was a matter of
actual and not only apparent impropriety, manifested in intemperate behavior on
the bench.' 1 It is worth noting here as well that an opinion is available on this
matter with full facts and explanation is precisely because it lies at this crucial
borderline between matters regarding outcomes, which are appropriate for
appeal, and matters purely regarding judicial misconduct.'m The lead opinion in
this case does note that it is "a most unusual case," which it may be on many
grounds, but in terms of promotion of judicial confidence in the judiciary, it
seems particularly noteworthy for the availability of a full explanation on the
legal appeal side and a cursory public treatment on the judicial conduct
regulation side (only a brief notice of reprimand, without explanation, was
provided in a press release).0 " There is something of a disconnect here between,
on the one side an indication that judicial misconduct is taken seriously where it
affects the course of a case, and on the other side, that the information made
available as a matter of the official handling of judicial misconduct misses an
opportunity to reassure the public in substantive or meaningful terms about the
quality of the judiciary or the quality of oversight of the judiciary.
Recusal was also the subject of some recent high profile cases in New
Zealand and Canada. For an indication of the imprecision and unreliability that
can be introduced into the regulatory scheme where bias allegations, and
particularly appearance-based analysis, are concerned, consider the matter before
the CJC in 2003 concerning Justice Boilard.'0 The CJC criticized the judge (via
letter) for an aspect of his handling of a case that was in the middle of trial.'os The
letter was leaked in advance to a journalist and garnered much public attention.'
Arguably wisely, given the focus in the Ethical Principles for Judges on public
confidence and appearances, the judge recused himself, reasoning that the public
100. Howell v. Lees Millais, [2007] EWCA Civ 720 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/
EWCA/Civ/2007/720.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
101. Id. f 4, 22-30, 32-33.
102. Id. 11.
103. Press Release, Judiciary of England & Wales, Mr. Justice Peter Smith--Office for Judicial
Complaints Investigation (Apr. 18, 2008), available at http://www.judicialcomplaints.gov.uk/docs/Mr
JusticePeterSmith_-_OJCInvestigationStatemenLO108.pdf [hereinafter Mr. Justice Peter Smith] (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
104. See generally CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL TO
THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE OF CANADA UNDER ss. 65(1) OF THE JUDGES AcT CONCERNING MR. JUSTICE JEAN-
GUY BOILARD OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF QUEBEC (2003), available at http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/
generaconduct-inq.boilardReportIC-200312_en.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
105. Id. at 3.
106. Id.
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might question his impartiality and his moral authority to continue the case.0o7 In
the first instance, the inquiry committee of the CJC found his recusal itself to be
misconduct, calling it an improper recusal undertaken in a fit of pique, and
finding that the judge was obliged to stay on the case.'os The full council
committee on the other hand, found this focus on appearances to be perfectly
appropriate and upheld the recusal as proper." The committee thus cannot even
seem to agree on the proper use of appearances for regulation of judicial conduct.
Another recent high-profile case from Canada implicates not only recusal
and appearances, but also alleged improprieties with regard to extrajudicial
speech."o Justice Matlow became very publicly embroiled in a controversy
regarding a private interest in a local development project."' The CJC Report,
which is exceedingly thorough in its provision of facts and reasoned analysis,
states:
It was not Justice Matlow's opposition, as a private citizen, to the
Thelma Road Project or his leadership of that opposition or his meeting
with public officials about that opposition or even seeking news media
coverage about the issue that is problematic. Instead it is the way in
which Justice Matlow carried out those activities that has raised entirely
legitimate concerns about his conduct."12
These concerns were based primarily on Justice Matlow's abuse of his
prestigious position as a judge in that private activity."' Justice Matlow continued
in this period to hear cases involving the city (to which he was privately opposed
in the development matter), raising concerns about recusal, on which the inquiry
committee and the full CJC were at variance, with the inquiry committee relying
on appearance standards and the CJC relying on actuality standards.' '4 This
seems, substantively, to get away from a focus on public confidence as the
driving force.
In New Zealand, a case concerning recusal appears to have created some
havoc in the office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner. A complaint was
initially lodged with the Commissioner in May 2008 regarding Supreme Court
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1-2.
109. Id. at 4.
110. For further discussion of the relationship between public confidence and the regulation of
extrajudicial speech, see infra Part IV.A.4.
111. CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL TO THE MINISTER
OF JUSTICE IN THE MATTER OF §65 OF JUDGES ACT REGARDING THE HONOURABLE THEODORE MATLOW OF THE
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE IT 1, 4-40 (2008), available at http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/
cmslib/general/MatlowDocs/Final%20Report%2OEn.pdf [hereinafter MATLOw REPORT] (on file with the
McGeorge law Review).
112. Id. 114.
113. Id. 117-23.
114. Id.9R124-163.
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Justice Wilson, who had refused to recuse himself from a case in which the
lawyer arguing the case was his business partner."' The Commissioner at the
time (Haynes) initially disclaimed any jurisdiction in the case, a position to
which there was opposition."'6 After a long period without action from the
Commissioner, the aggrieved party moved the Supreme Court to vacate the panel
opinion perceived to be tainted by Justice Wilson's bias, and prevailed."' Mr.
Haynes has since resigned from the JCC, and has been replaced by Mr.
Gascoigne, before whom the complaint is still pending."' The ramifications in the
judicial conduct complaint process have yet to be worked out, now nearly two
years after the initial complaint.'"
These examples provide some indication of the confusion that persists,
whatever the procedural mechanism in use, at the intersection of conduct and
decisionmaking in a regime ruled substantively on appearances.
3. Integrity
"Integrity" is an often-used but seldom well-defined term that can get bound
up with issues of public confidence as well as issues of appearances when it
comes to the substance of judicial conduct regulation.' 20 The public wants judges
with integrity. "Integrity," in this context, is often used as a kind of catch-all for
the general idea of being reasonably decent, upstanding, and honorable, but more
often than not it is used without any serious consideration of what any of those
ideas mean, exactly, within the context of the judicial role.121 Where integrity in
115. Phil Taylor, The Judge, the QC and the $8 Million Case, N.Z. HERALD, Dec. 12, 2009, available at
http:www.nzherald.co.nz/news/print.cfm?objectid=10614970 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
116. See id.
117. See Saxmere Co. Ltd. v Wool Bd. Disestablishment Co. Ltd. (2009) NZSC 122 (SC 64/2007).
118. See Taylor, supra note 115.
119. The case has continued to develop since the presentation of this paper at the Symposium and
remains unresolved. On the recommendation of the JCC, the Acting Attorney General had initially instituted
what would have been the first Judicial Conduct Panel for the further investigation of the Justice Wilson matter,
but before the Panel could take up its work, the Panel was struck down by the High Court. See Audrey Young,
Court Quashes Decision for Panel on Wilson Complaints, N.Z. HERALD, Sep. 28, 2010, available at
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/news/print.cfm?objectid=10676677 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
120. See ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 13 ("Judges should strive to conduct themselves with
integrity so as to sustain and enhance public confidence in the judiciary. Judges should make every effort to
ensure that their conduct is above reproach in the view of reasonable, fair minded and informed persons.");
ENGLAND & WALES GUIDE, supra note 12, at 19.
121. To the extent that "integrity" has a useful meaning, I would suggest that meaning has to do with
issues of consistency and genuine fit, issues that can become extraordinarily complex and difficult. One part, at
least, of the JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF ENGLAND & WALES, GUIDE TO JUDICIAL CONDUCr, supra note 12, at 19,
captures this aspect of the term, addressing issues of work/life balance, avoiding charges of hypocrisy, etc. So,
for example, there is the concern for integrity when looking at a judge's body of decisions-do the outcomes
appear to fit with the reasoning (or, indeed, has the judge provided reasoning to support outcomes? And does
that reasoning fit with the corpus of established law?) Or is there a conflict between whatever values are
embedded in the law and the judge's personal values? Can a judge have "integrity" if his or her values conflict
with the law to be applied? Is the "integrity" we value that which would require the judge to apply the law
199
2010 / Promoting Public Confidence in the Regulation of Judicial Conduct
this sense may be relevant for public confidence in terms of questions of conduct,
it may refer to an insistence that judges not consider themselves above the law,
and thus not engage in off-the-bench activities that indicate disrespect for the
law.122 There the behavior has nothing to do with, for example, the impartiality of
decisionmaking, but it indicates to the public that the judge's approach to the law
in the decisionmaking process may possibly be one of less than the required
deference. 2 3 Without further specific definition of what integrity means in the
various invocations in the guides to conduct in each of these countries, it is hard
for it to go much beyond the general idea of showing respect for the law and for
the judicial role. This may be a good aspiration to promote for the benefit of
public observers, but it is less than sufficiently precise for clear and consistent
application, which might ultimately cut against public confidence. Clarity will be
the key to the success of "integrity" as a standard, whether the confidence is
sought in the institution or in the oversight mechanisms specifically.
4. Impartiality: Demeanor and Speech
Judicial temper or demeanor is a common area for complaints about judicial
conduct readily associated with public confidence because of its public nature
and its close relationship with concerns about impartiality on the bench.
Rudeness or incivility from the bench-yelling at, mocking, or demeaning those
in the courtroom, whether they are lawyers, parties, witnesses, or court staff-
constitutes a judicial conduct problem appropriate for regulation.'A This
intemperate behavior demonstrates too much personal investment in the people
and/or the issues before the court to allow for appropriately impartial
decisionmaking. Whatever the source of the conduct (whether it be indulgence of
a personal or ideological bias or simply a rash or disrespectful nature), it shows
an inability to coolly consider the legal issues before the court. In any event, the
height of emotion impedes properly impartial decisionmaking, and regulation of
this conduct gets at core role-obligations, thereby potentially promoting public
confidence more broadly in the role. It is important to note that "intemperate"
speech need not be considered misconduct in all cases. The key distinction comes
from the source and the degree of the intemperance. It is only when either the
judge's irritation arises from some source outside the parameters of the case or
the irritation becomes so extreme (however legitimately provoked by happenings
within the case), as to indicate that the judge can no longer be properly impartial,
without regard for his or her own personal values, or is the integrity we value that which would allow the judge
to find some way of fitting one with the other? The idea of valuing "integrity" in the judicial role is far more
complicated than the sense of "honor" and respectable presentation to the public so often used. Given the more
complex sense of the word, this may play into public confidence, but primarily as a matter of looking at the
judge's decision-making.
122. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN GUIDE, supra note 12, at 6.
123. See, e.g., NEw ZEALAND GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 7.
124. See, e.g., ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 27; AUSTRALIAN GUIDE, supra note 12, at 17.
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that it would be misconduct to remain on the case in such a state.125 Substantive
regulation of this kind of conduct goes directly to the realities of impartial
decisionmaking, and in doing so sends an appropriate message to support public
confidence in the judiciary.
A related subject for judicial conduct regulation is extrajudicial speech,
which is also public in nature and potentially tied directly to concerns about
confidence in judicial impartiality.'26 Extrajudicial remarks may be delivered
quite dispassionately, and thus indicate no problem of intemperance, but there is
still a potential conduct problem due to the questions that may arise about
objectivity and open-mindedness on matters before the court, currently or in the
future. This is particularly problematic if the judge is making public statements
indicating an established position on an unsettled point of law or an application
of the law yet to be determined.127 Where a judge is unlikely to be called on to act
in an official capacity on a matter related to the statements, there may be no
problem.128 Judicial contribution to the development of the law can be very
valuable in certain circumstances, after all, so there is no need to stifle judges as
a general matter of conduct regulation, but in order to fulfill their obligations and
preserve public confidence, their involvement in law reform, for example, ought
to be kept within reasonable bounds and accompanied by appropriate recusals.129
To regulate these conduct issues gets at the core of the obligation of impartiality
and thus has the potential to send very positive and proper messages for purposes
of public confidence. However, for the present, the substantive regulation in this
area stops short of any apparent aspiration to affirmatively promote public
confidence through extrajudicial speech, but rather rests at restricting what would
undermine public confidence in the judiciary more broadly.
5. Sidestepping the Process: Apologies and Resignations
Two options have emerged that sit perhaps at the boundary between
substance and procedure in the regulation of judicial conduct: the apology and
the resignation. The Judicial Conduct Commissioner in New Zealand suggested
that there should be an option for dismissal, at his discretion, of a complaint that
has resulted in an apology from the judge in question, accepted as sufficient to
satisfy the complainant.o This would regard the regulation of conduct as a much
125. This is another indication of an instance in which behavior and biased substantive decision-making
may overlap in such a way that it would not make sense to deal with the issue exclusively by means of the
appellate process. See supra Part IV.A.2 for further discussion of bias as misconduct.
126. See, e.g., ENGLAND & WALES GUIDE, supra note 12, at 9, 34-35; ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note
4, at 28-29; AUSTRALIAN GUIDE, supra note 12, at 23.
127. NEW ZEALAND GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 6.
128. See, e.g., id. at 4 ("The requirement of impartiality does not mean that judges cannot have
sympathies or opinions about matters of public interest.").
129. Id. at 6, 11, 14.
130. See Judicial Conduct Amendment Act 2010, supra note 79, at § 15A(3).
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more a private than a public matter, which seems potentially at odds with a
robust view of public confidence in the judiciary. Might it not damage public
confidence to know that if the person complaining is satisfied, there is no further
recourse for an outraged public (or a public that would be outraged if only it
knew)? The 2010 Amendment Act addresses this point, empowering the
Commissioner to take no further action on a complaint (rather than dismissing it)
if it has either been resolved to the complainant's satisfaction by an explanation
from the judge, but stating that an accepted apology from the judge is, by itself,
insufficient to justify dismissal."' That may simply result in clever semantics, and
implementation will devolve to the discretion of the Commissioner, but perhaps
future annual reports will show how well the distinction can be drawn.
In another case considering the role of judicial apologies, the report of the
CJC to the Minister of Justice recommending removal of Justice Cosgrove
begins: "Public confidence in the judiciary is essential in maintaining the rule of
law and preserving the strength of our democratic institutions.""' Justice
Cosgrove had issued apologies for his conduct (perhaps better termed here
"acknowledgments of error"'), which became the subject of analysis in the CJC
Report, as follows:
Even accepting that the judge's apology was sincere, we must consider
an additional-more important-aspect in deciding whether a
recommendation for removal is warranted: the effect upon public
confidence of the actions of the judge in light of the nature and
seriousness of the misconduct. For Council, therefore, the key question is
whether the apology is sufficient to restore public confidence. Even a
heartfelt and sincere apology may not be sufficient to alleviate the harm
done to public confidence by reason of serious and sustained judicial
misconduct.'
After quoting a list of factors to be considered and referring to CJC
precedent, the report concluded by quoting the earlier decision in this matter that
"[g]iven the judge's serious misconduct over an extended period of time, this
statement, even viewed in its most positive light, cannot serve to restore public
confidence in the judge, or in the administration of justice."'
Along similar lines, one must consider the effect of resignations from the
bench-whether they should end the disciplinary process, whether they should be
131. See id. §§15A(2)(a), 15A(3).
132. CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL TO THE MINISTER
OF JUSTICE IN THE MATTER OF §65 OF JUDGES ACT REGARDING THE HONOURABLE PAUL COSGROVE OF THE
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE 1 (2009), available at http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/Report
toMinisterJusticeCosgrove.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
133. Id. at 7.
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id. at 9.
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publicized or explained, and so on. Canadian perspectives on this point
emphasize the priority of getting bad judges off the bench, so if not having to go
through the disciplinary process, or not having their resignations made any more
public than they will inherently be, will encourage that behavior, that is the
preferable course. To be fair, that policy aligns sensibly with the goal of public
confidence in the judiciary as an institution, underscoring as it does the practical
importance of who is and is not doing the judging. However, without more public
analysis or explanation, an opportunity to educate the public is lost, and an
opportunity is lost as well for development of the law of judicial misconduct by
deepening an understanding of what goes on and why it is or is not acceptable.
Thus there is perhaps value lost for any who seek public confidence in the
regulation of conduct itself. Accordingly, the judiciary of England & Wales has
been responsive in some measure to concerns about public information in this
area, and now at least provides public notice of judicial resignations in the face of
conduct complaints.
6. High Thresholds for Discipline or Removal
On occasion, an outcome seems unhinged from the goal of promoting public
confidence in a way that relates to the height of the threshold for discipline. In
one Canadian case, a judge had made extrajudicial statements to a newspaper on
a controversial matter of a political nature, which was likely to come before the
court of which he was a member.'16 This conduct was deemed by the CJC to be
highly "inappropriate and unacceptable" and the judge was found to have "failed
in the due execution of his office."1 7 However, the applicable standard for
removal was whether the breach is "so manifestly and profoundly destructive of
judicial impartiality, integrity and independence that it undermines individual and
public confidence in the justice system, thereby rendering the judge incapable of
performing the duties of his office[J"'" The CJC, finding that the standard was
not met, was left to accept the "unacceptable."" 9 It is arguable that the standard
itself, clearly intending to aim at public confidence, aims so low as to undermine
that confidence by accepting behavior that constitutes "failure."
It is perhaps less clearly a matter of a high standard, given the lack of
reasoning available, but there seems to be a similar issue in the case of Justice
Smith in the England, discussed above.'" While the excerpts of the transcript
available in the underlying case reveal behavior constituting clear violations of
136. INQUIRY COMM., REPORT TO THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE INQUIRY COMMITTEE
APPOINTED PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION 63(1) OF THE JUDGES ACT To CONDUCT AN INQUIRY CONCERNING MR.
JUSTICE BERNARD FLYNN WITH RESPECT TO STATEMENTS MADE BY HIM TO A JOURNALIST WHOSE ARTICLE
APPEARED IN THE NEWSPAPER LE DEVOIR ON FEBRUARY 23, 2002 5 (2002).
137. Id. at 43.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 43-44. Similar language appears in MATLOW REPORT, supra note 111, at 38.
140. Mr. Justice Peter Smith, supra note 103.
203
2010 / Promoting Public Confidence in the Regulation of Judicial Conduct
standards of conduct in ways that clearly bear on issues of public confidence in
the judiciary,' 4 1 the press release available on the OJC website (quoted here in its
entirety) says only:
Following investigation under the Judicial Discipline Regulations 2006,
the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice have carefully considered
the Court of Appeal's comments on the conduct of Mr. Justice Peter
Smith in the case of Howell and others v Lees-Millais and others and
have concluded that the conduct in question amounted to misconduct. As
a result, the Lord Chief Justice has issued a reprimand to the judge. The
Lord Chief Justice has said: "I consider that a firm line has now been
drawn under this matter. Both I and the Lord Chancellor value the
services of Mr. Justice Peter Smith and he has my full confidence." 42
Here, the underlying standard for conduct seems to have come unhinged
from disciplinary standards and explanations that would actually promote public
confidence in the handling of judicial misconduct. The facts, standards, and
reasoning used to reach a determination that a reprimand was the appropriate
sanction are not available for public examination. This leads to a less than
confidence-building conclusion that the public should rely on the fact that the
Lord Chief Justice has confidence in this judge. To the extent that public
confidence is meant to be placed either in the institution or in the conduct
oversight process, this approach of giving some but not enough information,
arguably fails.
The decision to establish and publish a code or guide to conduct, in and of
itself relates to public confidence, in that it sends a message that there are
substantive expectations about a certain level of quality in judicial work as well
as behavior, and it sets a basis for some form of enforcement. The substantive
content of such a code goes further: in defining the core qualities that matter; in
setting thresholds high or low when it comes to expectations of quality and
behavior; in establishing when appearances may matter as much or more than
realities; and in provisions of the code that reflect the extent to which core
judicial role obligations are owed to individuals or to the public at large. But for a
full picture of approaches to public confidence, we must turn also to matters of
process-to how this substance is put into practice.
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141. Howell v. Lees Millais, [2007] EWCA Civ 720 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/
cases/EWCA/Civ/2007/720.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
142. Mr. Justice Peter Smith, supra note 103.
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B. Factors Relating to Process in the Regulation of Judicial Conduct
1. Established, Consistent Procedures Known to the Public
While there is great variety in the procedural approaches used in these
different countries, there is generally agreement that public confidence is
enhanced by public awareness at least of the fact that there are mechanisms in
place for consideration and handling of allegations of judicial misconduct. The
clearest indication of the emphasis on this subject for purposes of public
confidence is in the brochures, pamphlets, and websites established in Canada,
New Zealand, and England & Wales to explain the processes for lay people, and
to make the processes readily accessible. The annual reports in each of these
three countries serve a similar function, though with greater emphasis on the fact
that the procedures are actually used to some effect.
The judiciary of England & Wales goes one step further by having a Judicial
Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman to oversee the procedures, reviewing
and auditing the work done by the OJC. New Zealand falls perhaps somewhere
between the belt-and-suspenders approach of England & Wales, and the informal
behind-the-scenes approach of federal courts in Australia, in that there are clearly
established procedures, but the one most clearly designed to appeal to public
confidence-the Judicial Conduct Panel-has never actually been used. The
failure to use the available procedure undermines its value for purposes of
confidence in the system of regulation.
Even where the focus is on public confidence in the primary work of the
judiciary, rather than on public confidence in the regulation of judicial conduct,
knowledge that there is some established mechanism for oversight presumably
aids in that broader goal. This is perhaps at least part of the motivation behind the
proposals for procedural reform in Australia.
2. Identity of Decisionmakers and Others in the Process
The identity of the decisionmakers and others officially involved in the
process may say much about what public confidence means in each of these
systems. Are they "insiders" or "outsiders"? Are they specially trained? How
many are involved in a given case? Is there oversight of the decisionmakers, and
if so, by whom? The answers to these questions have the potential to illuminate a
better understanding of what kind of public confidence is sought and why it
matters.
On the one hand, as suggested above, a direct way to address public
confidence would be to use the public in some way as the decisionmakers. 143
Participation and some measure of control would directly implicate that value.
143. See discussion supra at Part II.
205
2010 /Promoting Public Confidence in the Regulation of Judicial Conduct
Along related lines, with appearance standards looking for what the reasonable
observer would perceive, it would seem the most direct approach to simply ask
those reasonable observers. However, since no system examined in this Article
has taken this approach, perhaps the concern for public confidence is more a
matter of attempting to foster public confidence by letting the public know that
their confidence is a matter of concern, rather than asking them to make the
decisions.
The OJC in England & Wales has not taken quite so direct a route, but it has
gone some distance in this direction by involving non-judicial civil servants in
the process of handling complaints. Furthermore, when review bodies are
convened, they do include non-judicial members.'" Ultimate decisions are made
by the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, but having these "outsiders"
involved in the process demonstrates a strong commitment to the promotion of
public confidence that does not appear so strongly in other systems.
Australia's federal system takes a somewhat different angle on public
confidence in this area, in that the ultimate decisionmaking body on removal of
judges is Parliament. This is perhaps the most readily identifiable representative
body of the public at large, and the actual decisionmaking rests in that body's
hands, so it is a plausible construction of public confidence to repose the
authority there. However, this measure only covers removal of judges, not the
more run-of-the-mill judicial misconduct, so it is only a small gesture when it
comes to more everyday matters. Those are still handled largely by judges and
behind closed doors, which does little to affirmatively promote confidence in the
process or the outcomes.
New Zealand has a provision for the participation of lay members of the
public in the process, but only if a Judicial Conduct Panel is formed. Because that
has not yet happened, there has been no involvement of lay people at all in the
decisionmaking process in New Zealand. The Judicial Conduct Commissioner is
not a judge, which is perhaps helpful when it comes to a basic idea of "insiders"
and "outsiders," although the concerns about conflicts of interest have brought
into relief the reality that the legal community in New Zealand is so small that
the elite lawyers who would be asked to serve as Commissioner are, in fact,
"insiders" anyway, even if they are not members of the judiciary themselves.
3. Official Powers of the Decisionmakers
To a certain extent, the theme of the official powers of the decisionmakers
wraps back into concerns expressed earlier as a matter of high thresholds for
sanctions and as a matter of the identity of decisionmakers, but it also has further
implications for public confidence in the official availability of a range of
sanctions. If the public is aware only of the possibility of removal from the
144. The Judicial Discipline (Prescribed Procedures) Regulations, 2006, SI. 2006/676, §28 (U.K.).
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bench, and knows that this is reserved only for misconduct beyond the pale, the
natural concern would be that judges can therefore "get away with" a certain
amount of misconduct without ramifications. This takes the idea of judicial
"independence" in the wrong direction.
It may be that informally there is plenty of inherent power in the hands of the
relevant decisionmakers in any of these systems to discipline a judge for lower-
level misconduct in whatever way is appropriate to the circumstances, but if that
is not made explicit (as it is, for example in some of the provincial/territorial
systems in Canada 45 ), an opportunity is lost to buoy up public confidence.
England & Wales took a small step in this direction, without providing a list of
the lesser sanctions available, by issuing press releases, however cursory,
covering lesser sanctions imposed by the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief
Justice.'4 More explanation of those sanctions, of course, would be even better.
4. Transparency and Publicity Related to Judicial Misconduct
a. Transparency and Publicity of Reasoning and Outcomes
There is a bit of a contrast among these countries about the role to be played
by transparent provision of information in promoting public confidence in the
judiciary. This transparency breaks down into a few different categories of
information. There is information and publicity about outcomes of specific cases
regarding judicial misconduct, and the reasoning behind them. There is collective
information about the big picture of the judicial conduct regulation process (basic
statistics about numbers of complaints filed, types of misconduct claimed, the
number of cases resulting in discipline, and so on). Finally, there is information
about the availability of the judicial conduct complaints system and information
about how to use it. Each of these might influence public confidence in different
ways.
In Canada, for matters before the CJC, the reports of inquiry committees and
the ultimate recommendations of the full CJC are readily available via the CJC
website.147 There is a wealth of useful information and analysis in these reports,
but so few cases reach this stage (due either to resignations or dismissals early in
the process), that it is a small body of examples to work with. In Australia and
145. ONTARIO JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 5.
146. To view these statements, see OFFICE FOR JUDICIAL COMPLAINTS, PRESS RELEASES &
STATEMENTS, http://www.judicialcomplaints.gov.uk/publications/news.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2010) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
147. To view Inquiry Committee reports, see CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, INQUIRY COMMITTEE
DECISIONS, http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.calenglish/conduct-en.asp?selMenu=conduct-inquiry-en.asp (last visited
Aug. 12, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). To view reports from the full body of the CJC making
recommendations to the Minister of Justice, see CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, PAST NEws RELEASES,
http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.calenglish/news-en.asp?selMenu=news-pastrelease-en.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2010)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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New Zealand, there is almost no information readily available to the public about
reasoning in cases alleging judicial misconduct. As one Australian observer
writes: "Frankly, one of the difficulties, which is at once of course a blessing, is
that we have very little jurisprudence to draw upon in relation to the idea of
judicial misbehaviour." 48 In England & Wales, by contrast, this has been, in
recent years, a primary area of continued movement towards provision of more
and more information. It is still fairly little by state standards in the United States,
though perhaps it is similar to some recent developments in the federal system in
the United States.149 An editorial opinion piece in 2007 bemoaned the lack of
information made public about complaints against the judiciary of England &
Wales.5 o It noted that of 250 complaints made in 2004 (before the OJC existed),
sixty-eight resulted in some form of response, but none was deemed worthy of
public censure."' Since the creation of the OJC, there has been steady movement
toward more publicity of the names of judges and the disciplinary measures taken
against them,'52 but this still happens without sufficient details to understand what
happened to prompt the discipline or why that outcome was appropriate. The
value or efficacy of providing so little information along these lines remains
questionable insofar as it relates to public confidence either in the judiciary as an
institution or in the regulatory process.
Reasoned explanations, understandable to lay people, would surely be the
most meaningful device to achieve public confidence among those sufficiently
interested to try to understand the work of the courts and of those overseeing
judicial behavior. This is where many of the systems examined here fall short of
achieving all that might be achieved for purposes of public confidence across the
board.
b. Transparency and Publicity about the Process and its Availability
Canada and England & Wales have made particularly strong efforts as to the
transparency and publicity of the process and its availability. In Canada, there is
a booklet for the public explaining the process and the standards for conduct
complaints in non-technical language, and the annual reports provide simple,
practical examples of complaints and how they would be treated in the CJC
process."' In England & Wales, similar efforts to make the process known and
148. Sallman, supra note 39, at 12.
149. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCr FOR U.S. JUDGES, supra note 10; RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND
JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10.
150. Verkaik, supra note 64.
151. Id.
152. See Press Release, OJC 2008-2009 Annual Report, supra note 68.
153. See CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, THE CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND THE ROLE OF THE CANADIAN
JUDICIAL COUNCIL (2004), available at http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news-pub-judicialconduct
.CJCRole_2004_en.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); CJC 2008-2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 15, at 9-15; CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL ANNUAL REPORT 2007-
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easily accessible for lay people are visible in a very strong Internet presence with
very user-friendly information and direction. The annual reports of the OJC
recently introduced a similar device of simple exemplar complaints and results.
There is a further public confidence question buried in the matter of what kinds
of complaints to use in these small samples. The OJC report gives four examples,
all of which found that there was misconduct.' The examples from Canada are
now more varied as the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the complaints made."'
There are thus interesting questions to resolve about what will most help or hurt
public confidence, and what will best and most accurately educate the public
about the system, but the main thing, for public confidence, is the baseline effort
to make the process and its availability more widely known. A more limited
version of these approaches appears in New Zealand, where the JCC website
gives user-friendly information about how the process works, but there are no
exemplar cases or hypothetical results provided, and one can take much less in
the way of meaningful confidence from what is there.
In Australia, by contrast (but as makes sense in the absence of a formal or
centralized complaints handling procedure), there is little information for the
public about the process or the availability of any oversight mechanisms. The
recent Australian Senate committee report on improvements to the judicial
complaints handling process particularly notes this concern and specifically
"recommends that the High Court of Australia adopt a written complaint
handling policy and make it publicly available, including on its website ....
This demonstrates the importance of awareness of the process to its legitimacy in
the eyes of the public.
c. Publicity of Statistics
The explanatory brochure from the CJC takes a direct approach where
statistics are concerned, stating: "Canadians can have confidence in their judges.
From tens of thousands of judicial hearings that take place every year in
Canada's superior courts comes a very low number of complaints."' Indeed,
much effort appears to have gone into work on producing annual reports on
judicial conduct regulation in three of the countries at issue here, explaining how
the available processes have been used and generally what the results have been.
There is not enough information in these reports for a full substantive
understanding of judicial misconduct that is or is not occurring, but the effort at
2008: PROMOTING EFFICIENCY, ACCESSIBILITY AND QUALITY 15-27 (2008), available at http://www.cjc-
ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/AnnualReport-07-08_FINAL E.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Lw Review).
154. OJC 2008-2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 14-15.
155. CJC 2008-2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 9-15.
156. See JCC Website, supra note 78.
157. See AUSTRALIAN SENATE REPORT, supra note 41, at § 2.9.
158. CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, THE CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND THE ROLE OF THE CANADIAN
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 153.
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greater transparency is valuable nonetheless. Given the apparent lack of a deeper
public understanding of the workings of the judicial role, perhaps for the
purposes of the general public's confidence, the bare numbers and general
categories are sufficient or even preferable, simply to show that the process is
being used. Australia now has before it a proposal from the Senate Legal Affairs
committee that, following consultation about the best way to achieve this, all
federal courts publish quarterly complaint handling summary status reports on
their websites recording the number of complaints received and in relation to
each complaint, the date it was received, the nature of the complaint, the date on
which it was resolved, and a summary of any action taken in response to the
complaint.
d. Other Efforts
In Australia, courts have public information officers-not just for managing
crises, but also for regular educational purposes-in an attempt to make up for
the movement away from jury service.'6 Even so, there are concerns about ill-
informed griping about court decisions, so one judge has recommended the use
of retired judges or academics to change the tone by offering measured
explanations of these decisions and the work of the courts. Proper explanations
of decisions, asserts former Chief Justice Gleeson, are necessary to confidence in
the system.162 Obviously this applies across the board to all court decisions, but it
applies just as strongly to cases of alleged judicial misconduct.
The CJC's Ethical Principles for Judges goes somewhat further by putting
the responsibility on current judges to help educate the public:
Public education with respect to the judiciary and judicial independence
thus become an important function, for misunderstanding can undermine
public confidence in the judiciary.... Judges, therefore, should take
advantage of appropriate opportunities to help the public understand the
fundamental importance of judicial independence, in view of the public's
own interest. 63
Judges, as those with the most intimate understanding of what the role requires,
are indeed in a good position to help educate the public, but of course in doing
so, judges must be always mindful of the need to balance this educational
assistance with the maintenance of impartiality and independence in the role.
159. See AUSTRALIAN SENATE REPORT, supra note 41, at § 2.19.
160. Gleeson, supra note 7, at 4.
161. Woods, supra note 17, at 11.
162. See Gleeson, supra note 7, at 4.
163. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 11.
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Perhaps the greatest area of variation among these countries is in the
approaches to implementation of the substantive rules, guidance, and other
understandings or expectations about judicial conduct. Efforts to promote
awareness of the process and its outcomes are perhaps the most explicit or overt
part of any jurisdiction's efforts to promote public confidence-all the more so as
the focus shifts from confidence in the judiciary as a whole to confidence in the
regulatory mechanisms themselves. However, the mere fact of established
procedures is an important starting point for developing trust in the quality of the
judiciary as a whole. All of the choices that fall between that establishment of
procedures and the efforts at publicizing the work done through those
procedures-choices about who will make decisions and how, what their powers
will be, and so on-add nuances and direction to the efforts to achieve public
confidence and to a picture of what public confidence means in a given system.
V. CONCLUSION
Former Australian Chief Justice Murray Gleeson has said that the best way
for judges to gain public confidence is simply to do a good job. '6 In similarly
basic terms, it is true as well that the system needs integrity as a whole. Public
confidence is quite properly, even necessarily, a part of that whole, but it is not
itself the sole measure or guarantor of integrity. If a system promotes
impartiality, independence, integrity, and good behavior supportive of such traits,
presumably there will be better decisionmaking towards reaching actually just
outcomes. It is that better decisionmaking, those actually just outcomes, that will
be best designed to yield a byproduct of meaningful public confidence in the
judiciary. That is, if the system is designed to promote impartial decisionmaking,
meaningful public confidence should follow, whereas the fact of public
confidence does not necessarily ensure the legitimacy either of the institution or
individual decisions. The institution must be legitimate, and that substantive
legitimacy will in turn garner public confidence.
The regulation of judicial conduct plays an important role in maintaining the
legitimacy of the system so essential to achieving public confidence. To do that,
though, the regulation must be informed by the pursuit of those substantive
values and obligations that reside at the core of the concept of the judicial role. In
the end, meaningful public confidence will be best supported by an emphasis on
transparency and reason-giving, both in the judicial decisionmaking and in the
judging of judicial conduct. Both are necessary to a successful judicial (and
judicial regulation) system, but it is only insofar as public confidence is actually
informed by the facts illuminated by the transparency and the reason-giving, that
it can be meaningfully considered in reference to the success or failure of the
system. To this end, lawyers, as informed and invested actors working in the field
164. Gleeson, supra note 7, at 14.
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with judges, have the potential to play an important role in fostering public
confidence in the judiciary."' Still, I would suggest that the judiciary,
institutionally as well as individually, and the bodies that regulate judicial
conduct, ought to be aiming at the best possible quality of decisionmaking, rather
than aiming directly at public confidence itself and in so doing potentially
conveying the idea that the impression is more important than the underlying
reality.
Those systems that have edged or even aimed closer to seeking public
confidence in the regulatory or disciplinary process itself take the risk of losing
the important focus on establishing and maintaining public confidence in the day-
to-day work of the judiciary. Even though there is an important connection
between the latter focus and the regulation of conduct, in practice, the emphasis
shifts away from any meaningful analysis or education of the public about core
role obligation or proper fulfillment of the judicial role and toward provision of
bare statistics on complaints and dispositions, and the advancement of the
suggestion that judges need at all times to be under a watchful eye, to be kept in
check by these regulatory mechanisms. Where bare statistics and vague notions
of the need for vigilance become the focus, public confidence will not be best
served.
To the extent that the four systems discussed in this Article have involved lay
people as participants in the process of managing or evaluating complaints about
judicial conduct, and to the extent that they have opened the process to public
view through the publication of guides to conduct and, even more so, through the
publication of information about the handling of actual complaints, they get at
public confidence in a potentially meaningful way. To the extent that they
withhold information about judicial misconduct where it has in fact been
determined to have occurred, these systems might be getting at the realities of
misconduct behind the scenes, but they send the wrong message to the public and
unnecessarily risk the undermining of confidence in judicial conduct as well as
the conduct itself. Whatever the approach ultimately taken, even the process of
looking closely and thoughtfully at the mechanisms used and the provisions
written up by each of these systems will be useful in better understanding how
we might improve existing systems with innovations or refinements to make
judicial conduct regulation as broadly effective as possible. But at the end of the
day, meaningful public confidence will follow, rather than lead, efforts to achieve
the best in our judiciary through regulation of judicial conduct.
165. Id. at 12.
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